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A NEGLIGENCE APPROACH TO SECTION
14(E) VIOLATIONS
ABSTRACT
The tender offer is a common method used by third parties to gain control
of a company. Third parties will approach a company’s shareholders with the
opportunity to sell their shares at a fixed price, the result being a change in
ownership and control. A company’s top executives may be threatened by this
change in ownership and want to recommend that the shareholders reject the
offer. However, executives have a duty to act in accordance with the
shareholders’ best interests. This may lead to a conflict between the
shareholders’ interests and the executives’ interests. Section 14(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is designed to ensure that tender offers are not
alienated by these conflicts of interests faced by company executives, and to
ensure that shareholders are given all accurate information material to the
decision of whether to accept or reject the tender offer.
This Comment analyzes and critiques how circuit courts have historically
taken a scienter approach to Section 14(e) claims, largely due to the appealing
comparison to Rule 10b-5 and its requirements. A scienter requirement forces
plaintiffs to prove that defendants acted with sufficient culpability when
violating Section 14(e). This Comment proposes that courts alternatively
implement a negligence standard, requiring plaintiffs to prove that defendants
acted negligently in connection with a tender offer when alleging a violation of
Section 14(e). A negligence standard would make it easier for a plaintiff to prove
a violation of Section 14(e), which would mean an increase in claims asserted
against a company’s top executives. Therefore, a negligence standard would
increase executives’ exposure to liability, which could create positive change
toward executives focusing more on the shareholders’ interests than on their
own interests when evaluating tender offers.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you own 1,000 shares of Time Warner Inc. at $40 per share for a
market valuation of $40,000. One day, you are notified that AT&T has made a
formal tender offer to buy your shares at $55 per share but that the deal will only
close if 80% of the outstanding stock is tendered to AT&T by Time Warner’s
stockholders as part of the transaction. You have a couple of weeks to decide
whether you will tender your shares. If you decide to accept and enough shares
are tendered, the transaction is completed, and you’ll see the 1,000 shares of
Time Warner taken out of your account and a deposit of $55,000 cash put into
it. If the tender offer fails because less than 80% of the shares were tendered to
AT&T, the offer disappears and you don’t sell your stock. You’re left with your
original 1,000 shares of Time Warner in your brokerage account.
The transaction just described is known as a tender offer. A tender offer is a
broad solicitation by a third party to purchase a substantial percentage of a
company’s shares for a limited period of time.1 The offer is typically at a fixed
price above the current market price and is contingent on shareholders tendering
a fixed number of their shares.2 In the 1960s, the tender offer became a common
method used by third parties to gain control of corporations. To this day, the
tender offer remains a topic of contention as courts have tried to navigate the
elements of a claim made by stockholders regarding the possible mishandling of
a tender offer by company executives. Congress added provisions to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) by way of the Williams Act of
1968 in response to the growing popularity of tender offers.3 The Williams Act
regulates tender offers by requiring the offeror to disclose all material
information relating to the tender offer and by ensuring that current shareholders
have adequate time to consider the information provided before accepting or
rejecting the tender offer.4
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act was part of the Williams Act.5 The
purpose of Section 14(e) is to regulate the conduct of the broad range of people
who could influence the decision of company investors or the outcome of a

1
Fast Answers: Tender Offer, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answerstenderhtm.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Tender Offer].
2
Id.
3
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 404 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. dismissed 586 U.S. ___ (Apr.
23, 2019) (No. 18-459); see also Mark L. Berman, Note, SEC Takeover Regulation Under the Williams Act, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 580, 584 (1987).
4
Berman, supra note 3, at 584.
5
Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 404.
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tender offer.6 Thus, Section 14(e) is a broad anti-fraud provision requiring
persons engaged in making or opposing tender offers to accurately disclose all
material information in connection with the tender offer to the target company’s
shareholders.7
Section 14(e) generally prohibits two forms of conduct.8 First, the statute
prohibits the making of any false statements of a material fact and the omission
of any material fact necessary to make the statements made not misleading.9
Second, the statute prohibits “any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices.”10
Until 2018, when faced with the question of the correct burden of proof for
Section 14(e) claims, five federal circuits had ruled that plaintiffs asserting a
Section 14(e) claim were required to prove that the defendant acted with
sufficient culpability, as opposed to mere negligence.11 The concept of
culpability is often referred to as scienter, which functions as a way of limiting
the imposition of liability to persons whose conduct has been sufficiently
culpable to justify the liability.12 Each of these circuits pointed to the similar
language in Rule 10b-5, which the Supreme Court ruled requires proof of
scienter,13 in support of its holding that Section 14(e) requires scienter as well.14
A scienter standard requires a showing of intent or knowledge of the nature of
one’s act or omission.15 In contrast, a mere negligence standard does not require
a plaintiff to prove the defendant’s intentional wrongdoing.16 Thus, a scienter
requirement puts a heavier burden of proof on a plaintiff than does a negligence
standard.
On April 20, 2018, the Ninth Circuit created a circuit split regarding whether
claims asserting violations of Section 14(e) require a showing of negligence or
scienter.17 In Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff
6

Id.
See Mark J. Loewenstein, Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and the Rule 10b-5 Comparisons, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1311, 1311 (1983).
8
See Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 404.
9
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012).
10
Id.
11
See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
12
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir. 1973).
13
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
14
See infra Part I.B.
15
See Christopher Joseph Habenicht, Note, A Negligence Standard for Material Misstatements and
Omissions in Tender Offers Under 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733,
740 n.33 (1974).
16
See id.
17
See Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 408 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. dismissed 586 U.S. ___
7
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alleging a Section 14(e) violation need only show negligence, rather than
scienter.18 Because a scienter standard is a heavier burden of proof than a
negligence standard, the Ninth Circuit’s decision will make it easier for a
plaintiff to claim a violation of Section 14(e). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s
holding potentially places a company’s top executives—that is, the people who
have influence over the decision to accept a tender offer—at a higher risk of
these claims being asserted against them.
This Comment argues for the adoption of a negligence standard for claims
asserting violations of Section 14(e), consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s holding
in Varjabedian. Part I discusses the background of Section 14(e) of the
Exchange Act, the history of cases in which five circuits held that scienter was
a necessary element for Section 14(e) claims, and the context of the Ninth
Circuit’s holding in Varjabedian that led to the current circuit split. Part II argues
that a negligence standard under Section 14(e) is appropriate for four reasons:
(1) the text of the statute suggests that it can be readily divided into two clauses,
one requiring a showing of negligence and the other requiring proof of scienter;
(2) the legislative history of the Williams Act evinces an intent to require less
than an allegation of scienter; (3) the five circuits requiring proof of scienter
inappropriately used Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to interpret Section 14(e);
and (4) the similarities between Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act) and Section 14(e) warrant extrapolation of the case law under
Section 17(a) as precedent for a negligence standard. Finally, Part III discusses
the potential implications, from both a legal and policy perspective, that a
negligence standard would have on the judicial system and company executives.
Legally, a negligence standard would make it easier for a plaintiff to prove a
violation of Section 14(e), which means an increase in claims asserted against a
company’s top executives. From a policy standpoint, a negligence standard
would place a company’s top executives at a higher risk of these claims being
asserted against them, which could create positive change toward executives
focusing more on the shareholders’ interests than on their own interests when
evaluating tender offers.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 14(E) IN THE LAW

Following the enactment of the Exchange Act and the creation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Congress enacted Section 14(e) to better
protect individuals and companies involved in third-party takeovers. Since its
(Apr. 23, 2019) (No. 18-459).
18
Id.
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enactment, five federal circuits held that scienter was a necessary element for
Section 14(e) claims. However, a circuit split developed following the Ninth
Circuit’s holding in Varjabedian and its subsequent implementation of a
negligence standard. Before one can understand the context of the case law and
the subsequent circuit split, it is important to understand the history behind
Section 14(e)’s enactment. Section A of this Part walks through its history,
Section B addresses the history of cases in which five circuits implemented a
scienter standard, and Section C discusses the context of the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Varjabedian that led to the current circuit split.
A. History of Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Congress enacted the Securities Act and the Exchange Act in response to the
Great Depression.19 The Securities Act regulates initial public offerings by
companies.20 To do so, the Securities Act requires that investors have access to
“financial and other significant information concerning securities being offered
for public sale” when evaluating whether to invest in a company.21 Additionally,
the Securities Act prohibits deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraudulent
activities in the sale of securities.22
The primary method employed to achieve the requirements of the Securities
Act and to ensure the disclosure of a company’s key financial information is the
registration of securities.23 Securities sold in the United States must generally be
registered.24 A company seeking to sell its securities must disclose the following
information through the registration process: (1) “a description of the company’s
properties and business,” (2) “a description of the security to be offered for sale,”
(3) “information about the management of the company,” and (4) “financial
statements certified by independent accountants.”25 Registering companies are
required to report accurate information.26 If a company fails to do so, investors
have recovery rights if they can prove that a company disclosed incomplete or

19

Id. at 403.
Id. at 403–04.
21
Fast Answers: The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2019) [hereinafter The Laws].
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. There are exemptions to the general rule that offerings of securities must be registered. Exemptions
to the registration requirement include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) private offerings to a limited
number of persons; (2) offerings of limited size; and (3) intrastate offerings. Id.
25
Id. The four items listed are illustrative examples of the disclosure requirements mandated by the
registration process.
26
Id.
20
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inaccurate information of the kind discussed in this paragraph.27
While the Securities Act regulates initial public offerings through the
registration process, the Exchange Act regulates all subsequent securities
transactions.28 With the Exchange Act, Congress created the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and granted it “broad authority over all aspects of
the securities industry.”29 The Exchange Act also “identifies and prohibits
certain types of conduct in the markets and provides the [SEC] with disciplinary
powers over regulated entities and persons associated with them.”30
Congress added provisions to the Exchange Act by way of the Williams Act
of 1968.31 Congress enacted the Williams Act in response to the growing use of
cash tender offers as a way of acquiring control of public companies.32 A tender
offer is “a broad solicitation by a company or a third party to purchase a
substantial percentage of a company’s Section 12 registered equity shares or
units for a limited period of time.”33 Put simply, a tender offer is one of many
methods employed to gain control of a company by buying a certain amount of
shares from the company’s current shareholders. The offer is typically at a fixed
price above the current market price and is contingent on shareholders tendering
a fixed number of their shares or units.34
The Williams Act focuses on disclosure and is designed to protect investors
approached with a tender offer.35 Congress aimed to achieve this goal by
requiring full disclosure by the offeror and ensuring that investors have adequate
time to consider the disclosed information before being subjected to pressure to
tender their shares.36 In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., the Supreme Court
stated that the Williams Act “was styled as a disclosure provision: A bill to
provide for full disclosure of corporate equity ownership ….”37 Accordingly, the
Williams Act is designed to ensure that a target company’s shareholders
27

Id.
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 404 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. dismissed 586 U.S. ___ (Apr.
23, 2019) (No. 18-459).
29
The Laws, supra note 21.
30
Id.
31
Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 404.
32
Berman, supra note 3, at 584.
33
Tender Offer, supra note 1.
34
Id.
35
See Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S.
510 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong. 1 (1967) (“[The Williams
Act] is necessary for investor protection.”); Berman, supra note 3, at 583–85; see also Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977) (“[T]he sole purpose of the Williams Act [is] the protection of investors ….”).
36
Berman, supra note 3, at 584.
37
Piper, 430 U.S. at 27.
28
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evaluating a tender offer are not required to respond to the offer without
adequate information.38
Congress adopted a market approach for regulating tender offers, meaning
that it allows shareholders in the marketplace to define the fairness of tender
offers to shareholders themselves rather than applying legislative or courtimposed principles of fairness.39 Hence, the Williams Act does not impose on
the courts the task of evaluating the substantive fairness of a tender offer.40 The
Supreme Court affirmed this market approach towards regulating tender offers
in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.41 There, the Supreme Court held that
the sole objective of the Williams Act was full and fair disclosure of material
information to the target corporation’s shareholders.42 The Supreme Court
refused to interpret the Williams Act as allowing courts to evaluate the
substantive fairness of tender offers, noting that “the quality of any offer is a
matter for the marketplace.”43 Thus, once a court determines that an offeror fully
and accurately disclosed information material to the tender offer, the court’s role
is complete, and the shareholders ultimately decide if the terms and price of the
tender offer are fair based on the information disclosed.44
Consistent with the market approach adopted in the Williams Act, “Congress
expressly granted the SEC broad regulatory powers to prescribe disclosure
requirements applicable to large-scale accumulations of stock, third-party tender
offers, and issuer purchases of their own stock, as the SEC finds ‘necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.’”45 The five
sections of the Williams Act require either “the disclosure of specific
information or empowers the [SEC] to require the disclosure of information it
deems necessary for the protection of investors.”46
The focus of this Comment will be on Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, as
added by the Williams Act, which is a broad anti-fraud provision requiring
persons engaged in making or opposing tender offers to accurately disclose all
38

Berman, supra note 3, at 585.
Id. at 584; see Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (“[T]he quality of any offer is a
matter for the marketplace.”); H.R. REP. NO. 90-1711, at 3–4 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811,
2813 (“This bill is designed to make the relevant facts known so that shareholders have a fair opportunity to
make their decision [in response to a tender offer].”).
40
See Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 11–12.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 9.
43
Id. at 11–12.
44
See id.
45
Berman, supra note 3, at 585 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2012)).
46
Id.
39
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material information to the target company’s shareholders.47 Section 14(e)
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of
security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request,
or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this
subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.48

Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act has three functions. First, Section 14(e)
prohibits the making of false or misleading statements;49 second, it prohibits
“fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices”;50 and third, the SEC
is authorized under Section 14(e) to “define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative.”51
The first clause of Section 14(e) prohibits the making of false or misleading
statements of a material fact by any party in connection with a tender offer.52
The plain language of the statute “does not require that the prohibited statements
or omissions be made knowingly or with the intent to deceive or defraud.”53 In
other words, there is no explicit requirement that plaintiffs must prove that the
defendant acted with sufficient culpability in connection with a tender offer
when alleging a violation of Section 14(e).54 The concept of culpability, referred
to as scienter, requires some level of knowing or intentional deceit, which
amounts to more than mere negligence.55

47

Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 1311.
§ 78n(e).
49
Id. The language of this part of Section 14(e) is nearly identical to the second clause of Rule 10b-5 and
to Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act. Compare id., with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2018), and 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a)(2).
50
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). The language of this part of Section 14(e) is similar to the first and third clause of
Rule 10b-5 and to Sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act. Compare id., with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5(a), (c), and 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1), (3).
51
§ 78n(e).
52
Id.
53
Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 1331.
54
See id.
55
See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir. 1973).
48
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In the absence of a scienter requirement, some have argued that a mere
negligence standard, which requires no intent to deceive, would be the
appropriate standard under Section 14(e).56 The Supreme Court has yet to
resolve this dispute. In fact, it complicated the issue with two conflicting
opinions, one regarding SEC-promulgated Rule 10b-5 and the other involving
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, both of which contain nearly identical
language to Section 14(e).
Rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to the authority granted to the SEC by
Congress under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.57 Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 regulate the conduct of both buyers and sellers58 since they regulate “the
purchase or sale of any security.”59 The statute and the rule were enacted when
Congress determined that self-regulation by the stock exchanges was inadequate
to protect investors in the purchase or sale of securities.60 Each provides that
“any person who unlawfully manipulates the price of a security … shall be liable
in damages to those who have bought or sold the security at prices affected by
such violation or statement.”61
In contrast to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act only controls the conduct of sellers62 because it regulates only “the offer or
sale of any securities.”63 Much like Section 14(e), this statute was designed to
ensure complete and accurate disclosures and statements made in connection
with an offer of securities.64 The difference between Section 17(a) and Section
14(e) boils down to the flavor of transaction each regulates—the former
regulates initial public offerings, and the latter regulates tender offers.65
Many courts tend to cite cases involving violations of Section 10(b)/Rule
10b-5 when interpreting Section 14(e). This is in large part due to the nearly
identical language between the rule and the statute. In fact, Section 14(e) of the
Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5, and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act each appear
56

See Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 1331; Habenicht, supra note 15, at 735.
See § 78j(b) (“It shall be unlawful for any person … [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange … [,] any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” (emphasis added)).
58
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 687 (1980).
59
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (emphasis added); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018) (emphasis added).
60
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204 (1976).
61
Id. at 205–06.
62
Aaron, 446 U.S. at 687.
63
§ 77q(a) (emphasis added).
64
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 406 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. dismissed 586 U.S. ___ (Apr.
23, 2019) (No. 18-459).
65
Id.
57
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to prohibit two forms of conduct, one being false or misleading statements of a
material fact and the other being fraudulent acts. The following chart illustrates
the similar language between these statutes and the rule. The first row in the
chart represents the portion of each provision that indicates a negligence
standard,66 and the second row represents the portion that appears to mandate a
scienter requirement.67

Beyond their similar language, it may be appropriate to place precedential
weight on cases involving violations of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 and Section
17(a) based on the relationship between the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act. The Securities Act and the Exchange Act “constitute interrelated
components of the federal regulatory scheme governing transactions in
securities.”68 The Supreme Court has said that “the interdependence of the
various sections of the securities laws is certainly a relevant factor in any
interpretation of the language Congress has chosen ….”69
However, the interrelationship between these securities laws is not a
controlling factor that mandates interpreting the statutes in the same way.70
There are differences between these statutes and the rule that must be considered
when interpreting Section 14(e). Take the use of the word “fraudulent” in the
second clause of Section 14(e) as an example. The word “fraudulent” does not

66

§ 78n(e) (emphasis added); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2018) (emphasis added); § 77q(a)(2) (emphasis added).
§ 78n(e) (emphasis added); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (emphasis added); § 77q(a)(1), (3) (emphasis added).
68
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 727–30 (1975)).
69
Id. (quoting SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969)).
70
See id. at 207.
67
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appear in Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.71 Instead, the first clause of Rule
10b-5 prohibits the use of “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” and the
third clause of Rule 10b-5 prohibits “any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person ….”72 It
may be that Congress intended to expand the types of activities prohibited in
connection with tender offers beyond Section 10(b)’s prohibition against
“manipulative or deceptive device[s]”73 by including the word “fraudulent”74 in
Section 14(e).75 The Supreme Court has held that an element of deception must
be present for a cause of action to be stated under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5.76 Consequently, commentators have argued that “a fraud can occur in the
absence of a deception, so that a cause of action under Section 14(e) might be
premised on conduct that did not include a deception.”77
Supreme Court case law further muddies the water. On the one hand, the
Supreme Court held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder that Rule 10b-5 requires
proof of scienter,78 which has caused lower courts to similarly require plaintiffs
in Section 14(e) private actions to prove scienter.79 Yet, on the other hand, the
Supreme Court held in Aaron v. SEC that Section 17(a)(2), which prohibits false
or misleading statements, does not require proof of scienter.80 Based on the
similar language illustrated in the chart above, the Supreme Court’s holding in
Aaron suggested that scienter may not be a necessary element if the violation of
Section 14(e) is premised on a false or misleading statement. However, neither
Hochfelder nor Aaron resolved the question within the Section 14(e) context
because additional factors must be considered, including the legislative history
of the Williams Act, the relation of Section 14(e) to other sections of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act, and any policy considerations in
determining the elements of a Section 14(e) cause of action.81
In addition to prohibiting certain acts, Congress also granted the SEC the
power to define acts that are “fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative” and to
prevent these acts under Section 14(e).82 Pursuant to the powers granted to it
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

See § 78j(b).
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
§ 78j(b).
§ 78n(e).
See Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 1331.
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977).
E.g., Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 1331–32.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
See infra Part I.B.
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696 (1980).
Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 1331. For analysis of these further considerations, see infra Parts II–III.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012).
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under Section 14(e), the SEC has promulgated a number of rules to prevent
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative behavior in connection with a tender
offer.83 Among those rules promulgated under Section 14(e) is Rule 14e-3,
which generally prohibits trading on nonpublic information regarding tender
offers.84 Scholars have argued that Rule 14e-3 also prohibits trading activities
permissible under Rule 10b-5,85 once again illustrating the broader scope of
Section 14(e) as opposed to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
As previously discussed, Section 14(e) can be readily divided into two
clauses prohibiting two forms of conduct.86 First, the statute prohibits the
making of any false statements of a material fact and the omission of any
material fact necessary to make the statements made not misleading.87 Second,
the statute prohibits “any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices.”88 The key issue in interpreting Section 14(e) turns on whether
plaintiffs asserting a violation of Section 14(e) are required to show the
defendant acted with scienter or negligence. Before the most recent holding in
Varjabedian, five circuits held that the correct standard in a Section 14(e)
analysis is one of scienter.
B. Five Circuits Require Scienter for Section 14(e) Claims
Between 1973 and 2004, the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits all held that the correct standard of analysis for Section 14(e) claims
was one of scienter.89 In 1973, the Second Circuit became the first circuit to
address the underlying principles governing liability under Section 14(e) in
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.90 In Chris-Craft, Chris-Craft
Industries (CCI) informed Piper Aircraft Corporation that CCI would be
announcing a cash tender offer for the purchase of Piper stock and that CCI had
tentative plans to acquire a majority shareholder interest in Piper.91 After a
83

See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (2018).
Id. § 240.14e-3.
85
See, e.g., Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 1332.
86
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 404 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. dismissed 586 U.S. ___ (Apr.
23, 2019) (No. 18-459).
87
§ 78n(e).
88
Id.
89
See In re Dig. Island Sec. Litig., 357 F.3d 322, 328 (3d Cir. 2004); SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292,
1297 (11th Cir. 2004); Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 431 (6th Cir. 1980); Smallwood
v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir. 1974); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480
F.2d 341, 362 (2d Cir. 1973).
90
See Chris-Craft Indus., 480 F.2d at 362.
91
Id. at 351. In a statement released to the press on January 23, 1969, CCI announced a cash tender offer
beginning immediately and ending on February 3 for up to 300,000 shares of Piper at $65 per share. Id. The
84
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meeting with Piper management, Piper decided to oppose CCI’s bid for control
of the corporation.92 A contest for control of Piper later ensued between CCI and
other companies approached by Piper management.93 Ultimately, CCI lost the
battle for control of Piper even though it had invested $44 million in purchasing
Piper stock.94 CCI brought an action against Piper management, alleging they
had violated Section 14(e) when Piper publicly stated that CCI’s tender offer
was inadequate, among other assertions.95
When interpreting the elements of Piper’s Section 14(e) claim, the court in
Chris-Craft identified Rule 10b-5 as being nearly identical to the language of
Section 14(e).96 The court made one key distinction between the rule and the
statute—Rule 10b-5 is applicable to “the purchase or sale of any security,” while
Section 14(e) is applicable to “any tender offer … or any solicitation of security
holders in opposition to … any such offer ….”97 Therefore, the court followed
the same principles of a Rule 10b-5 analysis, holding that “a violation of Section
14(e) is shown when there has been a material misrepresentation or omission
concerned with a tender offer and when such misstatement or omission was
sufficiently culpable to justify granting relief to the injured party.”98
Notably, this is the first time a court introduced culpability, or scienter, into

price of Piper stock on the NYSE at the close of January 22 was $52.50. Id. This is illustrative of the definition
of a cash tender offer as defined in Part I.A of this Comment.
92
Id. Piper resisted CCI’s tender offer in several forms. Piper’s board of directors adopted a resolution
that CCI’s offer was not in the best interests of the Piper shareholders. Id. Letters were sent out the same day
asking Piper shareholders to delay accepting the CCI offer until the Piper management could adequately respond
to it. Id. A second letter was sent to Piper’s shareholders, stating that Piper’s board of directors have “carefully
studied this offer and [are] convinced that it is inadequate and not in the best interests of Piper’s shareholders.”
Id.
93
See id. at 351–54.
94
Id. at 354.
95
Id. at 355.
96
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). Rule 10b-5 was promulgated
pursuant to the authority granted to the SEC by Congress under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
§ 240.10b-5.
97
Chris-Craft Indus., 480 F.2d at 362.
98
Id. (emphasis added).
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the Section 14(e) analysis.99 The concept of culpability functions as a way of
limiting the imposition of liability to persons whose conduct has been
sufficiently culpable to justify the liability.100 In determining what constitutes
sufficient culpability in the Section 14(e) context, the court in Chris-Craft
considered the major congressional policy behind the securities laws and the
obligations of key players in a tender offer toward the target corporation’s
investors.101 The major congressional policy behind the securities laws is “the
protection of investors who rely on the completeness and accuracy of
information made available to them.”102 Officers of a target corporation have
greater access to information than do investors, which gives rise to an obligation
to disclose any “material facts about which the investor is presumably
uninformed and which would, in reasonable anticipation, affect his
judgment.”103 Because of this duty to disclose, the court concluded that a
knowing or reckless failure to discharge these obligations constitutes sufficiently
culpable conduct in violation of Section 14(e).104 More specifically, the court
announced the following standard for determining liability under Section 14(e):
[T]he standard for determining liability under § 14(e) on the part of a
person making a misleading tender offer, or a responsible officer of a
corporation making such an offer, is whether plaintiff has established
that defendant either (1) knew the material facts that were misstated or
omitted, or (2) failed or refused to ascertain such facts when they were
available to him or could have been discovered by him with reasonable
effort.105

The court, therefore, held that Piper violated Section 14(e) when it publicly
announced that it believed CCI’s tender offer was inadequate through a press
release and through letters sent to its shareholders.106
99
The court noted similarities between tender offers and proxy contests as they relate to the concept of
culpability. Id. at 362 n.14. Pointing out that a tender offer is like a contest, participants on both sides act quickly,
impulsively, often in anger and under the stress of the marketplace. Id. (quoting Elec. Specialty Co. v. Int’l
Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir. 1969)). These inherent characteristics of a tender offer, along with
Congress’s limited intentions to only assure basic honesty and fair dealing, should be considered when
evaluating the party’s conduct. Id. (quoting Elec. Specialty Co., 409 F.2d at 948).
100
Id. at 363.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
106
Id. at 366. The court supported its holding by discussing what a reasonable shareholder would have
assumed by Piper’s use of the term “inadequate.” The court stated that a reasonable shareholder would assume
that the term “inadequate” referred to price. Id. at 364. However, at that time Piper stock was selling on the
market for $52.50, while the tender offer was for $65 per share. Id. at 351. Thus, the court concluded that Piper’s
statement was materially misleading to its shareholders because Piper knew that its shareholders would rely on
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The Second Circuit reaffirmed its stance on the scienter requirement for
Section 14(e) claims in Connecticut National Bank v. Fluor Corp.107 To have a
successful action under Section 14(e), the court held that a “plaintiff must plead
and prove ‘an intent to defraud,’ ‘knowledge of falsity,’ or a ‘reckless disregard
for the truth.’”108 Proof of negligent conduct would not suffice to maintain a
Section 14(e) claim.109 Expanding on the requirements of a Section 14(e) claim,
the court also held that the plaintiff’s allegations of scienter do not require great
specificity, but rather “a minimal factual basis … which give[s] rise to a strong
inference” that the defendants acted with the necessary scienter.110
The Fifth Circuit followed the Second Circuit’s lead regarding the necessary
elements for determining liability under Section 14(e) in the 1974 case
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.111 In Smallwood, Pearl Brewing Company’s
board of directors approved a merger agreement between Pearl and Southdown,
Inc.112 Pearl sent a press release and cover letter to its shareholders, describing
certain provisions of the merger agreement between the two companies.113
Among these provisions described in the press release was a condition to Pearl’s
obligation to close; that is, Southdown was required to obtain an underwriting
commitment affording the former Pearl stockholders the opportunity to sell up
to 45% of the Southdown preferred stock they received in the merger.114
Although the merger agreement granted Pearl’s board of directors the power to
waive the underwriting commitment, the press release did not mention this
power.115 To implement this sell-out provision, Southdown mailed a cover letter
to Pearl’s shareholders, which the court ruled was a “request or invitation for
tenders,” that is, a tender offer covered by Section 14(e).116 Smallwood received
this offer as Pearl’s shareholder.117 Smallwood filed actions against Pearl and
Southdown, alleging in part that Southdown’s letter to Pearl’s shareholders
omitted several material facts—thus, violating Section 14(e)—including that the
merger could be consummated without an underwriting agreement.118
this representation. Id. at 364–65.
107
See 808 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1987) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that scienter is a necessary
element of a claim for damages under § 14(e) of the Williams Act.”).
108
Id. (quoting Chris-Craft Indus., 480 F.2d at 363).
109
Id.
110
Id. at 962.
111
489 F.2d 579, 605 (5th Cir. 1974).
112
Id. at 585.
113
Id. at 586.
114
Id. The merger agreement was later attached as an exhibit to a proxy statement. Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 586–87, 597.
117
Id. at 588.
118
Id.
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Agreeing with the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit held that the same
elements required to establish a violation of Rule 10b-5 must be proved to
establish a violation of Section 14(e).119 In dicta, the court noted that although
under common law plaintiffs were required to prove scienter, the federal courts
had taken a more liberal approach to the necessary elements for violations of
Rule 10b-5.120 However, the court further noted that “liability in a private action
for damages has apparently never been imposed for negligent conduct under the
Rule.”121 Thus, the court held that some culpability beyond mere negligence is
required for Rule 10b-5 claims and consequently for Section 14(e) claims.122
The court did not rule on the degree of scienter required because the plaintiffs in
the case failed to establish that the defendants acted with any culpability.123
Beyond ruling that Section 14(e) requires proof that the defendant acted with
some culpability, Smallwood also attempted to shed light on the disclosure
requirements demanded by the Williams Act.124 The court rejected the assertion
that prior disclosure in one communication to company shareholders will
automatically excuse omissions in another communication.125 The court noted
that the “adequacy of disclosure is a function of position, emphasis, and the
reasonable anticipation that certain future events will occur. Perception of future
events may take on a different cast as the future approaches, and, what is more
important, later correspondence may act to bury facts previously disclosed.”126
Hence, to protect company shareholders, the elements must be weighed each
time that the shareholders are requested (or encouraged) to make a new
decision.127 However, the court noted that its ruling does not mean that “a
material fact must be disclosed in each communication or be repeated before
each shareholder decision in order to avoid a violation of the securities laws.”128
The point being the adequacy of disclosure must be measured based on a totality119
Id. at 605 (“Congress adopted in Section 14(e) the substantive language of the second paragraph of
Rule 10b-5 and in so doing accepted the precedential baggage those words have carried over the years.”).
120
Id. at 606.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
See id. at 605.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 605–06 (citing Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 365 n.18 (2d Cir.
1973)).
128
Id. at 606 (“Facts may be adequately disclosed by emphasis or repetitions in previous correspondence
by the same parties or through outside sources.”). For example, in Johnson v. Wiggs, the Fifth Circuit held that
information reported in the newspapers and on television and readily available in any brokerage house was
sufficiently in the public domain; the defendant did not need to disclose that which had been publicly proclaimed
in several ways on several occasions. 443 F.2d 803, 806 (5th Cir. 1971).

PEKINSCOMMENTPROOFS_12.5.19

536

12/9/2019 12:28 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:519

of-the-circumstances, case-by-case approach.129
The Fifth Circuit ultimately reaffirmed the Second Circuit’s holding that
scienter is a necessary element of Section 14(e) claims in 2009 with Flaherty &
Crumrine Preferred Income Fund Inc. v. TXU Corp.130 In Flaherty, the court
held that both Section 10(b) and Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act require the
plaintiff to allege “(1) a misstatement or an omission (2) of a material fact (3)
made with scienter (4) on which the plaintiffs relied (5) that proximately caused
the plaintiff’s injury.”131 In the securities fraud context, scienter constitutes “an
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud” or “that severe recklessness in which
the danger of misleading buyers or sellers is either known to the defendant or is
so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.”132 The court ruled
that “severe recklessness is limited to those highly unreasonable omissions or
misrepresentations that involve … an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care.”133 Thus, ordinary negligence does not meet the requirements of
Section 14(e) claims in the Fifth Circuit.
In 1980, the Sixth Circuit joined the Second and Fifth Circuits in declaring
that Section 14(e) claims require proof of scienter in Adams v. Standard Knitting
Mills, Inc.134 In Adams, Chadbourn, Inc. acquired all of the common stock of
Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. after Standard’s stockholders agreed to exchange
their stock for a package of Chadbourn’s common and preferred stock.135 Prior
to this transaction, Standard sent its shareholders a proxy statement containing a
recommendation by Standard’s management favoring the proposed merger
between the two companies and Chadbourn’s financial statements prepared by
its accountants, Peat Marwick.136 Chadbourn had previously entered into loan
agreements, which placed certain restrictions on the use of retained earnings for
the payment of dividends to shareholders.137 These restrictions applied to the
payment of dividends on the capital stock of any class, including preferred
stock.138 Chadbourn’s financial statements prepared by Peat and attached to the
proxy statement provided to Standard’s shareholders erroneously stated that the

129

See Smallwood, 489 F.2d at 606.
565 F.3d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The elements of a claim under Section 14(e), which applies to
tender offers, are identical to the Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 elements.” (citing Smallwood, 489 F.2d at 605)).
131
Id. (emphasis added) (citing R2 Invs. LDC v. Phillips, 401 F.3d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 2005)).
132
Id. (quoting Phillips, 401 F.3d at 643).
133
Id. (quoting Phillips, 401 F.3d at 643).
134
623 F.2d 422, 431 (6th Cir. 1980).
135
Id. at 424.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 425.
138
Id.
130
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restrictions only applied to the payment of dividends on common stock.139 About
a year after the merger, Chadbourn’s sales unexpectedly dropped, which caused
a significant loss that wiped out its retained earnings and left it with a capital
deficit.140 Chadbourn was unable to pay dividends on its preferred stock.141
Standard’s shareholders filed a class action against Peat, alleging that the
accounting firm’s mistake in the financial statements amounted to false proxy
solicitation in an effort to gain shareholder approval of the merger between
Chadbourn and Standard.142
The court found Peat’s failure to point out that the restrictions on the
payment of dividends by Chadbourn applied to all capital stock was due to mere
negligence.143 Although the plaintiffs brought causes of action under Section
10(b) and Section 14(a), the court used the standard of liability imposed on
Section 14(e) claims when evaluating the claim under Section 14(a).144 The court
referred to the language of the Williams Act and the Supreme Court case Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder to justify its holding that scienter is an element of Section
14(e) claims.145 In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must
allege scienter—intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud—when bringing a
cause of action for damages under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.146
Accordingly, in Adams, the court ruled that Congress’s use of the words
“fraudulent,” “deceptive,” and “manipulative” in Section 14(e) indicated that

139

Id. Footnote 7 in the financial statements erroneously described the restriction as follows:
As to the note payable to three banks, [Chadbourn] has agreed to various restrictive provisions
including those relating to maintenance of minimum stockholders’ equity and working capital, the
purchase, sale or encumbering of fixed assets, incurrance (sic) of indebtedness, the leasing of
additional assets and the payment of dividends on common stock in excess of $ 2,000,000 plus
earnings subsequent to August 2, 1969.

Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
140
Id. at 425.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 424–25.
143
Id. at 426.
144
Id. at 431. The court referred to the House Report for the Williams Act to justify its use of the Section
14(e) standard of liability in this context, which stated in part that “[t]he cash tender offer is similar to a proxy
contest, and the committee could find no reason to continue the present gap in the Federal securities laws which
leaves the cash tender offer exempt from disclosure provisions.” Id. at 430 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 90-1711 at 3
(1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2813). The court noted that tender offers and proxy solicitations
are two methods designed to get to the same conclusion—corporate control—and thus are both subject to the
same type of abuse by corporate officers and the like. Id. Thus, Congress enacted the Williams Act to ensure
both methods were subject to the same disclosure requirements. See infra Part II.B.
145
Adams, 623 F.2d at 431. Hochfelder involved causes of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 187–88 (1976).
146
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193.
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Section 14(e) requires scienter based on the Hochfelder holding.147 As such, the
court ruled in favor of Peat since it found no intent behind Peat’s error.148
The Third Circuit was next to address the elements of a Section 14(e) claim
in the 2004 case In re Digital Island Securities Litigation.149 There, Digital
Island, Inc. and Cable & Wireless, PLC (C&W) executed a merger agreement
that involved C&W tendering an offer to purchase Digital Island’s shares from
its current shareholders, followed by a merger.150 Digital Island’s shareholders
filed a class action alleging violations of Section 14(e) based on two significant
business deals that were announced immediately after the expiration of the
tender offer.151 The plaintiffs alleged that both deals added value to the company
that would have substantially influenced the shareholders’ decision to tender
their shares if the deals were disclosed.152 Further, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants knew of the business deals prior to the expiration of the tender offer,
but “deliberately or recklessly failed to disclose the deals until after the
expiration of the tender offer.”153 Thus, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
violated Section 14(e) by making misleading statements and failing to disclose
material information in connection with the tender offer.154
In holding that “scienter is an element of a Section 14(e) claim,” the Third
Circuit echoed the analysis articulated by the Second Circuit.155 The court
defined scienter as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud.”156 Like other circuits, the Third Circuit court noted that Section 14(e)
is “modeled on the antifraud provisions of § 10(b) of the [Exchange] Act and

147
Adams, 623 F.2d at 431 (“Although Ernst & Ernst was decided several years after the enactment of
14(e), we are bound by its holding that Congress intends scienter when it uses [the words fraudulent, deceptive,
and manipulative].”).
148
Id. at 428.
149
357 F.3d 322, 328 (3d Cir. 2004).
150
Id. at 326.
151
Id. First, Digital Island announced a major business agreement with Bloomberg LP. Id. Second, Digital
Island announced another major business agreement with Major League Baseball (MLB). Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. The plaintiffs alleged that Digital Island’s board of directors suppressed the Bloomberg and MLB
deals to ensure the success of the tender offer and the subsequent merger. Id. When the tender offer succeeded,
the merger “cashed out various options to purchase shares of common stock as well as shares of restricted
common stock held by the Directors.” Id. at 329. The plaintiffs argued that the prospect of cashing out these
holdings “induced the Directors to suppress information that would have raised the value of Digital Island’s
shares.” Id. This increase allegedly would have jeopardized the merger because shareholders would not have
tendered their shares at $3.40. Id.
154
Id. at 324–25.
155
Id. at 328.
156
Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976)).
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Rule 10b-5,”157 which both require proof of scienter.158 The court noted that in
the past, it had construed Section 14(e) and Rule 10b-5 consistently because of
their similarities in both language and scope.159
Digital Island also addressed the enactment of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which established a heightened
pleading requirement for certain securities fraud cases.160 The PSLRA requires
plaintiffs to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”161 In the Section 14(e)
context, the PSLRA requires plaintiffs alleging violations of Section 14(e) to
“plead facts ‘with particularity,’ and these facts must give rise to a ‘strong
inference’ of a knowing or reckless misstatement.”162
Digital Island detailed two ways in which plaintiffs can meet the threshold
mandated by the PSLRA.163 First, plaintiffs may establish scienter with facts that
show a motive and an opportunity to commit fraud.164 In Digital Island, the court
ruled that the plaintiff’s inference of motive rested on an assumption devoid of
any factual basis.165 A second way that plaintiffs can meet the pleading
requirements of the PSLRA is by establishing scienter with circumstantial
evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior.166 The court defined a reckless
statement as one “involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence,
but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents
a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to defendant or is
so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.”167 Thus, the type of
recklessness required to prove scienter in the Section 14(e) context excludes
ordinary negligence and instead approaches conscious deception.168 In Digital
Island, the court found that the plaintiffs’ allegations failed to create a strong

157

Id. (quoting Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 10 (1985)).
Id. (citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193).
159
Id. The court cited an earlier Third Circuit case which adopted the same test of materiality for both
Section 14(e) and Rule 10b-5. Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 984–85 (3d Cir. 1984).
160
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012).
161
Id.
162
Digital Island, 357 F.3d at 329 (quoting § 78u-4(b)(2)).
163
Id. at 328–29.
164
Id. at 328.
165
Id. at 330–31. To establish a strong inference of motive, the plaintiffs would have had to “allege some
facts tending to show how the Directors could have hoped to make out better by unloading their options and
restricted stock than by realizing the impact of the Bloomberg and MLB deals on their shares, either in the
market or in a merger with another suitor.” Id. at 331.
166
Id. at 328–29.
167
Id. at 332 (quoting In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999)).
168
Id.
158
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inference of recklessness.169
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit joined the Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth
Circuits in holding that scienter is a necessary element for a Section 14(e) claim
in the 2004 case SEC v. Ginsburg.170 In Ginsburg, the SEC brought a civil action
against Ginsburg alleging in part that he violated Section 10(b) and Section 14(e)
of the Exchange Act when he provided material nonpublic information to his
brother and father regarding two corporations, who subsequently used that
information to trade on each corporation’s stock.171 The court held that to
establish liability under both Section 10(b) and Section 14(e) of the Exchange
Act, the SEC must prove that Ginsburg “acted with scienter, a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”172 In support of its
holding, the court cited SEC v. Adler, a case involving alleged violations of
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act.173
Like the other circuits’ ruling on a scienter requirement, the Eleventh Circuit
appears to have relied on the common wording of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 and
Section 14(e) in arriving at its holding.
Circuits were consistent in requiring a showing of some form of scienter for
Section 14(e) claims. This changed on April 20, 2018, when the Ninth Circuit
held in Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp. that plaintiffs asserting claims under
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act need only show negligence, rather than
scienter.174 In reversing the district court’s decision dismissing the complaint,
the Ninth Circuit created the current circuit split surrounding the elements of
Section 14(e) claims.

169
Id. Since the plaintiffs’ allegations showed that the defendants’ interests were always tied to the value
of their shares, the court found “no basis to infer the sort of conscious disregard and deliberate ignorance required
to plead scienter.” Id. At most, the plaintiffs’ allegations proved some mismanagement, which does not fall
within the anti-fraud prohibitions of Section 14(e). Id.
170
362 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2004).
171
Id. at 1295. Ginsburg was the chairman and CEO of Evergreen Media Corporation. Id. at 1296.
Evergreen became interested in acquiring EZ, so Ginsburg reached out to EZ’s CEO and ultimately submitted a
bid to acquire EZ. Id. The bid eventually fell through. Id. However, the SEC presented evidence that throughout
the discussion between Evergreen and EZ, Ginsburg was communicating with his brother and father, and
subsequent to those communications his brother and father would purchase large amounts of EZ stock. Id. This
evidence suggested that Ginsburg was providing insider information to his brother and father for use to make
trades. Id.
172
Id. at 1297 (citations omitted). This definition of scienter is identical to the Third Circuit’s definition
of scienter as established in Digital Island. Digital Island, 357 F.3d at 328.
173
137 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 1998).
174
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 401 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. dismissed 586 U.S. ___ (Apr.
23, 2019) (No. 18-459).
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C. The Ninth Circuit’s Negligence Standard
The Ninth Circuit considered the issue of whether Section 14(e) claims
require proof of scienter in Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp.175 The case involved a
merger between Emulex Corp. and Avago Technologies Wireless
Manufacturing, Inc.176 In February 2015, the corporations issued a joint press
release announcing that they had entered into a merger agreement.177 The merger
agreement provided that Emerald Merger Sub, Inc., a subsidiary of Avago,
would initiate a tender offer for Emulex’s outstanding stock on April 7, 2015.178
A target corporation of a tender offer may issue a statement to the corporation’s
shareholders on whether to accept or reject the tender offer.179 Emulex issued
this recommendation statement to its shareholders.180
Prior to issuing the recommendation statement to its shareholders, Emulex
engaged Goldman Sachs for an opinion on the fairness of the merger agreement
to the corporation’s shareholders.181 Goldman Sachs provided Emulex with
financial analyses supporting its opinion that the merger agreement was fair to
the corporation’s shareholders.182 Part of Goldman Sachs’s financial analyses
was a one-page chart that listed seventeen transactions in the industry that
Goldman Sachs deemed most similar to the proposed merger between Emulex
and Avago.183 Goldman Sachs reviewed the premiums stockholders received in
those similar transactions and determined that Emulex’s 26.4% premium fell
within the normal range of the premiums listed in the one-page chart.184
However, Goldman Sachs found Emulex’s premium to be below average when
compared to the seventeen similar transactions.185 Despite the below-average
premium, Goldman Sachs concluded that the merger agreement was fair to
Emulex’s shareholders.186
Emulex issued a statement to its shareholders recommending that they
175

Id.
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 402. A tender offer occurs where an offeror “seeks to obtain control of a target corporation … by
publicly offering to purchase a specified amount of the target company’s stock.” Id. The target corporation’s
stockholders are asked to “‘tender’ their shares, at a fixed price, customarily in excess of the current market
value, in order to gain control of the target company.” Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 402–03.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 403.
176
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accept the tender offer.187 Emulex listed nine reasons for its recommendation,
one being that Goldman Sachs found that the merger agreement was fair.188
However, Emulex chose not to summarize the one-page chart in the
recommendation statement, thus omitting the fact that Goldman Sachs found
Emulex’s premium below average in relation to the seventeen similar
transactions.189 Emulex’s shareholders accepted the tender offer, and the merger
commenced in May 2015.190 The decision not to include Goldman Sachs’
finding that the premium fell below average led to a class action by some of the
shareholders against Emulex, Avago, Emerald, and Emulex’s board of
directors.191 The class of shareholders alleged that Emulex violated Section
14(e) of the Exchange Act when it failed to include the below-average premium,
thereby misleading the shareholders for the purpose of accepting the tender
offer.192
The United States District Court for the Central District of California
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, following the authorities of the other circuits
holding that Section 14(e) claims require proof of scienter.193 The plaintiff
appealed the district court’s dismissal of the securities fraud claim, thereby
allowing the Ninth Circuit to decide on the issue of whether Section 14(e) claims
require proof of scienter for the first time.194
The Ninth Circuit held in Varjabedian that Section 14(e) claims require a
showing of negligence rather than scienter.195 This decision led to the current
circuit split regarding the elements of Section 14(e) claims. The Ninth Circuit
supported a negligence standard by (1) using the plain language of the statute,
(2) distinguishing between Rule 10b-5 and Section 14(e), (3) comparing Section
14(e) to Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, and (4) using the legislative history
of the Williams Act.

187

Id. at 402.
Id.
189
Id. at 403.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
See Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1226, 1233 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“Considering the
wealth of persuasive case law to the contrary, the Court concludes that the better view is that the similarities
between Rule 10b-5 and § 14(e) require a plaintiff bringing a cause of action under § 14(e) to allege scienter.”).
The district court noted in its opinion that the Ninth Circuit had yet to address the issue of whether Section 14(e)
claims require proof of scienter. Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 401.
194
Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 401.
195
Id.
188
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1. The Plain Language of Section 14(e)
The Ninth Circuit first pointed to the plain language of the statute to support
a negligence standard.196 The court noted that Section 14(e) could be readily
divided into two clauses, each of which prohibits different conduct:
It shall be unlawful for any person [1] to make any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, or [2] to engage in any
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection
with any tender offer ….197

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Congress used the word “or”
to denote two separate offenses under the statute.198 While the second clause
prohibits fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative acts, the court noted that the
first clause must prohibit conduct other than fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts.199 The court reasoned that construing the statute otherwise
“would render it ‘hopelessly redundant’ and would mean ‘one or the other phrase
is surplusage.’”200 The use of the words “fraudulent,” “deceptive,” and
“manipulative” in the second clause indicated to the court that the statute’s
second clause required scienter.201 Because the text of the first clause of Section
14(e) is devoid of any suggestion that scienter is required, and since the court
believed that Congress wanted to avoid this redundancy, the court concluded
that the first clause of Section 14(e) requires a showing of only negligence.202
2. Differences Between Rule 10b-5 and Section 14(e)
The Ninth Circuit was also unpersuaded by the reasoning of the five circuits
that had required proof of scienter.203 The court noted that “the decision from
these five circuits rest on the shared text found in both Rule 10b-5 and Section
14(e).”204 However, the court concluded that there are key distinctions between
Rule 10b-5 and Section 14(e) which “strongly mitigate against importing the
scienter requirement from the context of Rule 10b-5 to Section 14(e).”205
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

Id. at 404.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012)).
Id.
See id.
Id. (quoting Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1976)).
See id.
Id. at 408.
See id. at 405.
Id.
Id.
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The first distinction between Rule 10b-5 and Section 14(e) discussed by the
Ninth Circuit is based on the Supreme Court case Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.206
In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court held that claims under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 must allege scienter.207 However, the Supreme
Court noted in its opinion that the language of Rule 10b-5(b),208 when viewed in
isolation, “could be read as proscribing, respectively, any type of material
misstatement or omission … whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not.”209
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Hochfelder as acknowledging that
the language of Rule 10b-5(b) could be read as imposing a negligence
standard.210
Because of the identical language between Rule 10b-5(b) and the first clause
of Section 14(e),211 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Section 14(e) could also be
read as imposing a negligence standard.212 Further, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the Supreme Court’s holding in Hochfelder was based on the relationship
between Rule 10b-5 and its authorizing statute, Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, and not based on the text of Rule 10b-5.213
The Ninth Circuit identified a second distinction between Rule 10b-5 and
Section 14(e): The SEC is authorized to regulate a broader array of conduct
under the latter.214 The court noted that “[u]nder § 14(e), the SEC may prohibit
acts not themselves fraudulent under the common law or § 10(b), if the
prohibition is reasonably designed to prevent acts and practices that are
fraudulent.”215 Thus, concluding that Section 14(e) itself reaches only fraudulent
conduct requiring scienter would be inconsistent with the SEC’s authority to
prohibit “acts themselves not fraudulent.”216

206

See id. (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)).
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193.
208
Rule 10b-5(b) states that “[i]t shall be unlawful … [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading ….” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2018).
209
Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 405 (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212).
210
Id.
211
See supra Part I.A.
212
Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b), with 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012).
213
Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 405–06 (“Put simply, Rule 10b-5 requires a showing of scienter because it is
a regulation promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, which allows the SEC to regulate only
manipulative or deceptive devices. This rationale regarding Rule 10b-5 does not apply to Section 14(e), which
is a statute, not an SEC Rule.”).
214
Id. at 407.
215
Id. (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997)).
216
Id.
207
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3. Similarities Between Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section
14(e)
The Ninth Circuit further justified its holding by pointing out the similarities
between Section 17(a)217 of the Securities Act and Section 14(e) of the Exchange
Act. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in
Aaron v. SEC that Section 17(a)(2) does not require a showing of scienter.218
The Ninth Circuit noted that Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act and the first
clause of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act contain almost identical language,
both prohibiting “any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made … not
misleading.”219 The court reasoned that because of this identical language
between the two statutes and because the Supreme Court held that Section
17(a)(2) of the Securities Act does not require scienter, Section 14(e) might not
require scienter either.220
Beyond their plain language, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section
14(e) serve similar purposes—they both “govern disclosures and statements
made in connection with an offer of securities ….”221 This similarity is important
in the overall evaluation because “statutes dealing with similar subjects should
be interpreted harmoniously.”222 The distinction between Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act and Section 14(e) is the type of transaction that each statute
regulates—the former applies to initial public offerings and the latter applies to
tender offers.223

217

Section 17(a) of the Securities Act governs the sale of securities through interstate transactions:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities (including security-based
swaps) or any security-based swap agreement (as defined in section 3(a)(78) of the Securities
Exchange Act) by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
§ 77q(a).
218
Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 406 (citing Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696–97 (1980)).
219
Id. Compare § 77q(a)(2), with § 78n(e).
220
See Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 406.
221
Id.
222
Id. (quoting Jonah R. v. Carmona, 446 F.3d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 2006)).
223
Id.
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4. The Legislative History of the Williams Act
Finally, the Ninth Circuit referred to the legislative history and purpose of
the Williams Act in support of its holding that Section 14(e) requires a showing
of negligence.224 The Senate Report on Section 14(e) stated that “[the] provision
would affirm the fact that persons engaged in making or opposing tender offers
or otherwise seeking to influence the decision of investors or the outcome of the
tender offer are under an obligation to make full disclosure of material
information to those with whom they deal.”225 Further, the purpose of the
Williams Act is partly to ensure that public shareholders are not required to
respond to a tender offer without first obtaining adequate information.226 Based
on the legislative history of the statute, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “the
Williams Act places more emphasis on the quality of information shareholders
receive in a tender offer than on the state of mind harbored by those issuing a
tender offer,” which supports a negligence standard.227
The Ninth Circuit ultimately ruled that “because the text of the first clause
of Section 14(e) is devoid of any suggestion that scienter is required,” the first
clause of Section 14(e) requires a showing of only negligence, not scienter.228 In
so holding, the court criticized the rationale behind each of the five circuits that
had previously announced a scienter requirement for Section 14(e) claims.229
Based on these four factors, the Ninth Circuit correctly split from the previous
circuits’ precedent when it held that the correct standard of review was one of
negligence and not scienter.
II. THE NEGLIGENCE APPROACH
As previously discussed, the federal judicial system had a longstanding
history of requiring proof of scienter when alleging a Section 14(e) violation.230
Some of these holdings have been, in part, a product of district courts honoring
the precedent of federal circuits and maintaining some consistency across the
224

Id. at 407–08.
Id. at 408 (quoting S. REP. NO. 90-510 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2821).
226
Id. (quoting Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975)).
227
Id.
228
Id. Because the district court based its holding on a scienter requirement, the court remanded the case
to the district court for consideration based on a negligence standard. Id. Although this lessens the plaintiff’s
burden, the plaintiff is still required to show that the defendants omitted a material fact which misled Emulex’s
shareholders in connection with accepting the tender offer. The court noted that Emulex’s omission of the belowaverage premium would most likely not be considered a material fact, thus likely leading to a dismissal of the
complaint again. See id.
229
Id. at 406.
230
See supra Part I.B.
225
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federal courts.231 Rather than point to the precedent of other circuits and the
similar language in SEC-promulgated rules, the Ninth Circuit took a fresh look
at Section 14(e) and made a compelling argument for a negligence standard.232
As a result of the textual interpretation of the statute, the legislative history
behind Section 14(e)’s implementation, and due to both the differences between
Section 14(e) and Rule 10b-5, as well as the similarities between Sections 14(e)
and 17(a), this Part argues in support of a negligence standard for Section 14(e)
liability claims. Section A discusses a textual interpretation of the statute, which
breaks Section 14(e) down into two distinct clauses. Section B argues why the
legislative history of the Williams Act supports a negligence standard. Section
C discusses why courts should not use Rule 10b-5 when interpreting Section
14(e), considering the former is an SEC-promulgated rule based on authority
granted by Congress, and the latter is a statute enacted by Congress itself.
Finally, Section D argues that similarities between Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act and Section 14(e) warrant extrapolation of the case law under
Section 17(a) as precedent for a negligence standard.
A. Textual Interpretation Through a Plain Reading of Section 14(e) Supports
a Negligence Standard
As identified by the Ninth Circuit in Varjabedian, a plain reading of Section
14(e) readily divides the statute into two clauses.233 First, the statute prohibits
“any untrue statement of a material fact or … [an omission of] any material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made … not misleading ….”234
Second, the statute prohibits “any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices ….”235 The use of the word “or” dividing the two clauses suggests that
the statute prohibits two different types of conduct in connection with tender
offers.236 The first clause explicitly requires two elements: (1) the fact must be
untrue or, if an omission, misleading, and (2) the fact must be material.237 Hence,
Section 14(e) does not explicitly require plaintiffs to prove that the defendant
knew they were making an untrue statement when alleging a violation under the

231
See, e.g., Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1226, 1233 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“Considering
the wealth of persuasive case law to the contrary, the Court concludes that the better view is that the similarities
between Rule 10b-5 and § 14(e) require a plaintiff bringing a cause of action under § 14(e) to allege scienter.”).
232
See supra Part I.C.
233
Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 404.
234
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012).
235
Id.
236
Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 404.
237
§ 78n(e).
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first clause of Section 14(e).238 Comparatively, the second clause explicitly
requires some form of intentional wrongdoing, whether it be fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.239 At common law, one element necessary to
establish fraud is that the defendant acted with scienter.240 This plain reading of
the statute supports the theory that Section 14(e) prohibits two different types of
conduct, each with its own requirements.
A holding that Section 14(e) requires proof of scienter fails to consider the
fact that the statute can be divided into the two clauses identified above. When
the statute is divided as such, it is apparent that the first clause prohibits conduct
distinct from the second clause, which prohibits any third party from
intentionally defrauding a target corporation’s shareholders in connection with
a tender offer.241 The second clause appears to demand proof of scienter based
on the use of the words “fraudulent,” “deceptive,” and “manipulative.”242 In
contrast, the first clause of Section 14(e) is devoid of any words that evince a
scienter requirement.243 The plain language of this part of the statute “does not
require that the prohibited statements or omissions be made knowingly or with
the intent to deceive or defraud.”244
An example is useful to showcase how different interpretations of Section
14(e) might play out in a hypothetical case. Imagine that AT&T makes a tender
offer to Time Warner Inc.’s stockholders, offering to pay $55 per share if at least
80% of the outstanding stock is tendered to AT&T by Time Warner’s
stockholders. Time Warner’s board of directors evaluates the offer and
determines that it is in the best interest of the stockholders to reject the offer. In
its letter to the stockholders recommending that they reject AT&T’s offer, the
board omits the fact that Time Warner just lost its biggest client and will be
experiencing a significant decline in revenues. Assume that a court would find
Time Warner’s upcoming drop in revenues to be material. This would constitute
an omission of a material fact by Time Warner’s board. If this case were heard
in a circuit requiring scienter, then the corporation’s stockholders would have to
prove that the board knowingly and intentionally omitted this fact from its letter
to the stockholders to defraud, deceive, or manipulate them into rejecting the
238

See Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 1331.
§ 78n(e).
240
See, e.g., Strategic Diversity, Inc. v. Alchemix Corp., 666 F.3d 1197, 1210 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012); Heitman
v. Brown Grp., Inc., 638 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
241
See Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 404 (arguing that the statute can be readily divided to prohibit two types
of conduct and that the first clause prohibits negligent acts).
242
See § 78n(e).
243
See id.
244
Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 1331.
239
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tender offer. It can be very difficult to prove that a defendant acted with a
particular state of mind. This circuit is arguably ignoring the first part of Section
14(e), which only explicitly requires an omission of a material fact. Under the
hypothetical situation, Time Warner’s stockholders can prove that the board
omitted a material fact from them.
On the other hand, imagine that this case was heard by a circuit that
interpreted Section 14(e) as prohibiting two different types of conduct as
dictated by its two clauses. The stockholders could claim one of the following,
consistent with Section 14(e)’s two clauses: (1) the board was negligent in
omitting a material fact, or (2) the board intentionally omitted the material fact
to manipulate the stockholders into rejecting the tender offer. Therefore, the
stockholders could successfully claim the necessary elements of the alleged
Section 14(e) violation under the first clause and continue with the case. This
would be true because the first clause of the statute provides no explicit
requirement that plaintiffs must prove the defendant acted with sufficient
culpability in connection with a tender offer when alleging a violation of Section
14(e).245
A scienter requirement limits liability to those whose conduct has been
sufficiently culpable to justify such liability.246 Circuit courts are doing just that
by imposing a scienter requirement on Section 14(e) claims. Some may argue
that Congress has had over forty years to correct the courts’ interpretation of
Section 14(e) and that the failure to do so speaks for itself, a canon of statutory
construction known as the legislative inaction/acquiescence canon.247 The
acquiescence canon presumes that Congress approves of a judicial interpretation
of a statute if it is aware of that interpretation and does not amend the statute.248
Although this canon has been given weight in other contexts, the acquiescence
canon has been the subject of criticism because inaction is not dispositive of
anything.249 One court stated that “[l]egislative inaction is a weak reed upon
which to lean in determining legislative intent.”250 Alternatively, if Congress
wanted to require scienter, it would not have included the first clause of Section
14(e) because that conduct would fall within the second clause. The better
argument is that Congress wanted Section 14(e) to cover mere negligent conduct
with regard to tender offers.
245
246
247
248
249
250

See id.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir. 1973).
Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 375 (2010).
Id.
Id.
Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (Or. 1966).
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The presumption against redundancy also supports the premise that the
statute prohibits two different types of conduct in connection with tender
offers.251 The presumption against redundancy requires each word in a statute to
have independent meaning, and it requires refraining from interpretations that
would render a word useless.252 If, by the first clause of Section 14(e), “Congress
intended to prohibit only those misstatements or omissions that were
accompanied by an intent to deceive, or scienter, then the section is redundant
because the acts and practices prohibited by the second clause include fraudulent
misstatements and omissions.”253 When a court construes the statute as requiring
proof of scienter, the court is rendering the first clause of Section 14(e) useless,
having no real meaning or contribution to the statute as a whole. Some may
argue that the first clause should merely be taken as an example of the fraudulent
conduct prohibited by the second clause. Yet a better interpretation of Section
14(e) would give meaning to the first clause of the statute as opposed to
rendering it surplusage. Accordingly, scienter cannot be a necessary element of
the first clause of Section 14(e) if the two clauses were to have independent
significance.254
B. The Legislative History of the Williams Act Supports a Negligence
Standard
The assertion that Section 14(e) requires a showing of negligence, rather
than scienter, is also supported by general considerations of the legislative
history and purpose of the Williams Act. Although its legislative history is not
extensive and never specifically mentions a scienter or negligence standard,
there is some indication that the first clause of Section 14(e) did not intend
anything regarding the defendant’s state of mind.
One piece of history that supports a negligence standard comes from the
Senate Report of the bill:
Proposed subsection (e) would prohibit any misstatement or omission
of material fact, or any fraudulent or manipulative acts or practices, in
connection with any tender offer …. This provision would affirm the
fact that persons engaged in making or opposing tender offers … are
under an obligation to make full disclosure of material information to

251
The presumption against redundancy is one of many canons of statutory construction used when
interpreting the meaning of a statute. See Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 404 (9th Cir. 2018), cert.
dismissed 586 U.S. ___ (Apr. 23, 2019) (No. 18-459); Scott, supra note 247, at 363.
252
Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 404; Scott, supra note 247, at 363.
253
Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 1335.
254
Id. at 1335–36.
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those with whom they deal.255

The Senate Report separates the prohibition against misstatements and
omissions from the prohibition against fraudulent activity.256 Further, it gives no
indication that the misstatements and omissions had to be made knowingly or
with any specific mental state.257 The Senate Report also addresses the overall
legislative concern for full and fair disclosure.258 That concern for adequate
disclosure would support the theory that the first clause of the statute requires
less than an allegation of scienter because it “appears to require the affirmative
disclosure of material facts of the nature enumerated in the specific tender offer
disclosure provisions of the Williams Act.”259 Instead of proscribing intentional
wrongdoings, that part of the statute is “directed toward instances of inadequate
disclosure, whether in the form of affirmative misrepresentations, half-truths, or
total nondisclosure.”260
Additionally, a 1970 amendment to Section 14(e) indicates that “the separate
operation of the clauses was congressionally contemplated.”261 The amendment
added the last sentence of Section 14(e), giving the SEC rulemaking power to
“define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and
practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.”262 The amendment does
not mention material misstatements and omissions, but rather reproduces the
language in the second clause of Section 14(e).263
Further, the House Report describing the rulemaking authority in the
amendment draws a clear distinction between false statements covered by the
first clause of Section 14(e) and fraudulent or deceptive practices prohibited by
the second clause: “The section would amend [Section 14(e)] of the Securities
Exchange Act, which prohibits [1] false statements and [2] fraudulent or
deceptive practices …. It would grant to the Commission rulemaking power to
… prevent fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative practices ….”264 It follows
255
S. REP. NO. 90-550, at 10–11 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2812; see also
Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 1336.
256
Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 1336.
257
Id.
258
See S. REP. NO. 90-550, at 10–11; see also Habenicht, supra note 15, at 754.
259
Habenicht, supra note 15, at 736.
260
Id. at 737.
261
See id. at 738.
262
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012).
263
See id.
264
H.R. REP. NO. 91-1655, at 6 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5025, 5030 (emphasis added);
see Habenicht, supra note 15, at 738. The SEC also drew a distinction between the two clauses, stating prior to
the amendment that “section 14(e) prohibits false statements and fraudulent or deceptive practices in connection
with tender offers, but does not specifically grant the Commission any rulemaking authority to deal with such
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that the operation of the amendment—its language inferring a scienter
requirement—is restricted to the second clause of Section 14(e).265
The House Report on the 1970 amendment indicates that the purpose of the
addition was “to allow the Commission to deal more effectively with the devices
sometimes employed on both sides in contested tender offers.”266 These devices
contemplated by the addition, and thus by the second clause of the statute,
include “phony mergers” and “manipulations of market price during the offering
period,” not the executives’ duty to disclose all material information to
shareholders as contemplated by the first clause.267 With this amendment,
Congress gave the SEC power to implement the second clause’s prohibition of
deceptive acts and practices.268 Both Congress and the SEC appeared to
acknowledge this difference in the scope of the first and second clauses of
Section 14(e) and, “consistent with a theory of separability for the purpose of
determining standards of liability, left the prohibition of misstatements and
omissions of material facts unaffected by the scienter language in the
amendment.”269
A negligence standard is further supported by the many references to proxy
rules and regulations in the legislative history of the Williams Act.270 Although
most lower courts referenced Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b) when interpreting
the requirements of Section 14(e),271 the legislative history of the Williams Act
indicates that Section 14(e) is more appropriately construed with reference to
the proxy rules and regulations.272 One statement made by the Williams Act’s
principal sponsor during debates on the floor of the Senate provides support for
the apparent relationship between the tender offer provisions of the Williams
Act and the proxy rules.273 Senator Williams stated that “what this bill would do
is to provide the same kind of disclosure requirements which now exist, for
example, in contests through proxies for controlling ownership in a company ….
This legislation is patterned on the present law and the regulations which govern
proxy contest.”274 Other references in the legislative history of the Williams Act,
practices.” H.R. REP. NO. 91-1655, at 10 (emphasis added).
265
Habenicht, supra note 15, at 738.
266
H.R. REP. NO. 91-1655, at 4.
267
Habenicht, supra note 15, at 738.
268
Id. at 739.
269
Id.
270
Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 1337.
271
See supra Part I.B.
272
Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 1337.
273
Id.
274
113 CONG. REC. 24,665 (1967). During the Senate debate, Senator Jacob Javits stated that Senator
Harrison Williams “represents to the Senate, and I accept his representation fully, that this [bill] is analogous to
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including language in the House Report275 and a statement by then-SEC
Chairman Manuel Cohen,276 suggest that the scope of disclosure required by the
tender offer provisions of the Williams Act was patterned after the rules
governing proxy solicitation. This assertion is supported by the similarity of the
underlying shareholder activity protected—“both tender offers and proxy
contests involve a decision by shareholders on the future composition of
management.”277 Additionally, both provisions are “designed to insure that
target shareholders receive enough information to make such choices
intelligently.”278 In each situation, “the effect of a potential change in
management and control is crucial to the investor’s decision.”279 It makes sense

the proxy rules, so that very much the same principles obtain as to what the British call a takeover, as to a proxy
fight by a group of stockholders.” Id.
275
The House Report accompanying the Williams Act included the following language:
The cash tender offer is similar to a proxy contest, and the committee could find no reason to
continue the present gap in the Federal securities laws which leaves the cash tender offer exempt
from disclosure provisions …. This bill is designed to make the relevant facts known so that
shareholders have a fair opportunity to make their decision.
H.R. REP. NO. 90-1711, at 4 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2813.
276
At the House Hearings on the Williams Act, Chairman Cohen noted:
The procedures provided by the bills in the case of contested tender offers are analogous to those
now followed when contending factions solicit proxies under the Commission’s proxy rules. These
rules … are generally accepted as having been successful in providing adequate and accurate
information to shareholders in contests for control of their companies. While there are obvious
differences between tender offers and proxy contests, there is in both situations the common
element of concern with the future management and control of the company. Adequate material
information is equally important to a shareholder who is faced with a decision whether to sell his
securities or retain his investment in the company.
Takeover Bids: Hearings on H.R. 14475 and S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm.
on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong. 13 (1968).
277
Habenicht, supra note 15, at 751.
278
Id.
279
Id. at 751–52. In the House Hearings, SEC Chairman Cohen noted:
It is argued by some that the basic factor which influences shareholders to accept a tender offer is
the adequacy of the price. But … how can an investor evaluate the adequacy of the price if he
cannot assess the possible impact of a change in control? Certainly without such information he
cannot judge its adequacy by the current or recent market price. That price presumably reflects the
assumption that the company’s present business control and management will continue.
Takeover Bids: Hearings on H.R. 14475 and S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm.
on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong. 13 (1968). The future of management is one consideration that
all investors evaluate in making investment decisions. In the context of a proxy contest, a shareholder makes her
investment decision when she casts her vote for or against incumbent management. In the tender offer context,
a target shareholder makes a similar investment decision when she determines whether she will tender her shares
to the offeror. Thus, “[e]qual protection should be afforded shareholders making these analogous investment
decisions, under the corresponding antifraud provisions, Rule 14a-9 and § 14(e).” Habenicht, supra note 15, at
752 n.100.
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to interpret statutes and rules on tender offers consistent with interpretations of
proxy rules considering tender offers and proxy contests are two ways of
achieving the same goal—gaining control of a company.
Rule 14a-9, the proxy anti-fraud provision, is of particular significance to
this comparison:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of
any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other
communication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at the
time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is
false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits
to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in
any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy
for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or
misleading.280

Rule 14a-9 has language identical to the first clause of Section 14(e), both
prohibiting misstatements and omissions of material facts within their respective
methods of gaining control of a company.281 Rule 14a-9 and the first clause of
Section 14(e) each impose a duty of disclosure on persons engaged in activities
contemplated within the respective provisions, and “the proper standard for
imposing liability under either … [provision] will depend on the nature and
extent of this duty of disclosure, and the degree of care necessary for its
satisfaction.”282 In private damage actions for alleged violations of Rule 14a-9,
courts generally have not required a showing that the defendant acted with
scienter.283 Courts have agreed that the duty of disclosure will not be satisfied,
and liability may attach, when a defendant has made statements which he should

280

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2018) (emphasis added).
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9.
282
Habenicht, supra note 15, at 750 (citing Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341,
363 (2d Cir. 1973)). In White v. Abrams, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the assertion that the proper standard for
imposing liability depends on the extent of the duty of disclosure owed to shareholders but determined that a
further requirement of scienter was unnecessary, stating that it was “unfortunate that the Second Circuit
attempted to limit this duty by requiring some degree of scienter or culpability and holding that mere negligent
conduct would not be sufficient for liability.” 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
283
Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777–78 (3d Cir. 1976) (“[S]ection 14(a) and Rule
14a-9(a) may be more closely analogized to section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 …. Since section 11 of the
Securities Act clearly establishes negligence as the test for determining liability, the parallel … strongly
support[s] adoption of negligence as the standard under section 14(a).”); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478
F.2d 1281, 1300–01 (2d Cir. 1973) (“[W]here the plaintiffs represent the very class who were asked to approve
a merger on the basis of a misleading proxy statement and are seeking compensation from the beneficiary who
is responsible for the preparation of the statement, they are not required to establish any evil motive or even
reckless disregard of the facts.”).
281
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have known were materially false or misleading—that is, when the defendant
acted negligently in misstating material facts.284 The similarity of both purpose
and intended effect in Rule 14a-9 and Section 14(e), together with their nearly
identical language, “may warrant extrapolation of the case law under Rule 14a9 as precedent for a negligence standard” under the first clause of Section
14(e).285
C. Inappropriate Use of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to Interpret Section
14(e)
As discussed in Part I.B, most lower courts imported the scienter
requirement from the context of Rule 10b-5 to Section 14(e),286 largely due to
the similar language of the two provisions.287 However, there are fundamental
differences between Rule 10b-5 and Section 14(e), some identified by the Ninth
Circuit in Varjabedian, that strongly undercut the argument for a scienter
requirement.288
To understand the scope and limitations of Rule 10b-5, a court must look to
the scope of its authorizing statute, Section 10(b).289 In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, the Supreme Court held that Section 10(b) mandates a scienter
requirement.290 The Supreme Court found several grounds for requiring proof of
scienter. First, the plain meaning of the language of Section 10(b), specifically
its use of the terms “manipulative,” “device,” and “contrivance,” evinced a
congressional intent to proscribe only “knowing or intentional misconduct.”291
284
See, e.g., Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1300–01. In ruling that negligence was the appropriate standard for Rule
14a-9 allegations, the court noted differences between Section 14(a) compared to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5. First, the court noted that rather than emphasizing a prohibition of fraudulent activity, Section 14(a) indicates
a congressional concern with “protection of the outsider whose proxy is being solicited.” Id. at 1299. Second,
the court noted that although a negligence standard in Rule 10b-5 would undercut the express civil liability
provisions of the securities laws, “a reading of Rule 14a-9 as imposing liability without scienter … is completely
compatible with the statutory scheme.” Id. Third, the court noted that a negligence standard would “serve to
reinforce the high duty of care owed by a controlling corporation to minority shareholders in the preparation of
a proxy statement ….” Id. at 1300. In contrast, the court noted that allowing a negligence standard under Rule
10b-5 would deter the significant corporate policy of publicly disclosing important business and financial
developments. Id. These differences between Section 14(a) and Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are “equally
applicable to a comparison of Section 14(e) and Rule 10b-5.” Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 1338; see also infra
Part II.C.
285
Habenicht, supra note 15, at 750.
286
See supra Part I.B.
287
See supra Part I.B.
288
See Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 407 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. dismissed 586 U.S. ___
(Apr. 23, 2019) (No. 18-459).
289
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
290
425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
291
Id. at 197–99.
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Contrary to Section 10(b), Section 14(e) is not limited to terms that demonstrate
an intent to prohibit only intentional wrongdoing.292 Section 14(e) also
proscribes any untrue statements of material fact without explicitly requiring
that those untrue statements be made with sufficient culpability.293
The Supreme Court also found support in the overall statutory scheme of the
federal securities law in holding that Section 10(b) mandates a scienter
standard.294 In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court referred to several differences
between Section 10(b) and certain provisions of the Securities Act.295 First,
because the language of Section 11 of the Securities Act differs from the
language of Section 10(b), and because Section 11 does not impose a scienter
requirement, the Supreme Court noted that Section 10(b) must require
scienter.296 Additionally, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress imposed
significant procedural safeguards to combat the effect of the express civil
remedy provisions of the Securities Act allowing recovery for negligent conduct,
but that no such safeguards exist for allegations of Section 10(b).297 As such, the
Supreme Court concluded that extending Section 10(b) to cover negligent
conduct would conflict with congressional intent because “such extension would
allow causes of action covered by §§ 11, 12(2), and 15 to be brought instead
under § 10(b) and thereby nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn
procedural restrictions on these express actions.”298
With regard to Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court in Hochfelder noted that when
viewed in isolation, the language of Rule 10b-5(b) “could be read as proscribing
… any type of material misstatement or omission, and any course of conduct,
that has the effect of defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was
intentional or not.”299 However, this interpretation of Rule 10b-5, implying that
it also governs negligent conduct, would conflict with the prevailing
interpretation of Section 10(b), which must require scienter to preserve the
overall statutory scheme of the federal securities law. Since the SEC’s
rulemaking power was limited by the scope of its statutory authority, the
Supreme Court held that Rule 10b-5 must likewise be restricted to conduct
involving scienter.300 Section 14(e), on the other hand, operates under no such
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300

Compare § 78n(e), with § 78j(b).
See § 78n(e).
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 206–11.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 209–10.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 210–12.
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constraints.
While Rule 10b-5 is an SEC-promulgated rule circumscribed by the
provisions of its authorizing statute Section 10(b), Section 14(e) is itself
congressionally promulgated and is therefore subject to no similar limitation.301
Section 10(b) does not contain language proscribing untrue statements of
material fact like the language that appears in disclosure provisions such as
Section 14(e).302 Instead, Section 10(b) only prohibits the use of “manipulative
or deceptive” devices and grants the SEC the power to “prescribe [rules and
regulations] as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.”303 Because Rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to the
power granted in Section 10(b), the statute is a limitation on the operation of the
rule. Since Section 14(e) is not limited in the same manner as Rule 10b-5, the
contention that a scienter standard must be read into Rule 10b-5(b) because
Section 10(b) claims require proof of scienter is inapplicable to Section 14(e).304
Similarly, courts are not bound by the precedent imposing a scienter standard
for Rule 10b-5 in its entirety when evaluating allegations of Section 14(e)
violations.305
The above factors, which contributed to the Supreme Court’s holding that
Section 10(b) requires proof of scienter, are not applicable to Section 14(e). The
language of the first clause of Section 14(e) is not consistent with the language
of Section 10(b).306 Rather, the first clause of Section 14(e) is identical to Rule
10b-5(b),307 which the Supreme Court in Hochfelder acknowledged could be
read as covering negligent conduct.308
D. A Comparison of Section 17(a) and Section 14(e) Supports a Negligence
Standard
Although the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the dispute over whether
scienter or negligence is the appropriate standard under Section 14(e), there is
some support for a negligence standard in Supreme Court case law. As discussed
in Part II.C, Hochfelder may be used as support for a negligence standard
because the Supreme Court acknowledged that the nearly identical language in
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308

Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2018), with 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012).
Compare § 78n(e), with § 78j(b).
§ 78j(b).
Habenicht, supra note 15, at 747–48.
Id. at 748.
Compare § 78n(e), with § 78j(b).
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2018).
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976).
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Rule 10b-5 may be read as prohibiting conduct beyond intentional
wrongdoing.309 Additionally, the similarities in both language and purpose of
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 14(e) may warrant putting
precedential value on the Supreme Court’s holding in Aaron v. SEC that Section
17(a)(2) does not require proof of scienter.310
Aaron may be used as precedent to support a negligence standard under
Section 14(e) because of the statute’s nearly identical language to Section 17(a).
Both statutes prohibit “any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made … not
misleading.”311 Additionally, both statutes prohibit intentional conduct that
requires more than mere negligence.312 In holding that Section 17(a)(2) does not
require scienter, the Supreme Court in Aaron looked at the plain language of the
statute.313 Although the terms in Section 17(a)(1) evince a clear congressional
intent to require scienter, Section 17(a)(2) is devoid of any indication of a
scienter requirement.314 Likewise, Congress evinced a clear congressional intent
to require scienter under the second clause of Section 14(e) by using the terms
“fraudulent,” “deceptive,” and “manipulative.”315 Yet the first clause of Section
14(e) is devoid of any indication of a scienter requirement, much like Section
17(a)(2).316
The Supreme Court in Aaron explicitly rejected the suggestion that there
should be a uniform culpability requirement for Section 17(a) because the
language of the statute is not amenable to that interpretation.317 The Supreme
Court noted that each subparagraph of Section 17(a) “proscribes a distinct
category of misconduct. Each succeeding prohibition is meant to cover
additional kinds of illegalities—not to narrow the reach of the prior sections.”318
Even though Congress more illustratively broke out the prohibited conduct in
Section 17(a) into subparagraphs,319 Congress distinguished the two different
types of conduct prohibited by Section 14(e) with the use of the word “or”

309

See supra Part II.C.
446 U.S. 680, 696–97 (1980).
311
Compare § 77q(a)(2), with § 78n(e).
312
Compare § 77q(a)(1), with § 78n(e).
313
Aaron, 446 U.S. at 696.
314
Id.
315
See Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 412 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. dismissed 586 U.S. ___
(Apr. 23, 2019) (No. 18-459).
316
Id.
317
Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697.
318
Id.
319
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012).
310
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separating the two clauses.320 This similarity provides further support for
importing a negligence standard on Section 14(e).
The Supreme Court further recognized that since Congress apparently
drafted Section 17(a) to compel the conclusion that scienter is required under
Section 17(a)(1) but not under Section 17(a)(2), “it would take a very clear
expression in the legislative history of congressional intent to the contrary to
justify the conclusion that the statute does not mean what it so plainly seems to
say.”321 The Supreme Court found no such contrary congressional intent in the
legislative history of Section 17(a).322 Consequently, under Aaron, there would
have to be a clear expression in the legislative history of the Williams Act of
congressional intent to require scienter under Section 14(e) in its entirety.323
There is no such congressional intent in the legislative history of Section 14(e),
as discussed in Part II.B.324
Beyond their plain language, Section 17(a) and Section 14(e) serve similar
purposes—they both “govern disclosures and statements made in connection
with an offer of securities ….”325 This similarity is important in the overall
evaluation because “statutes dealing with similar subjects should be interpreted
harmoniously.”326 The distinction between Section 17(a) and Section 14(e) is
the context—the former applies to initial public offerings, and the latter applies
to tender offers.327
There is much support for finding a negligence standard under Section 14(e).
A plain reading of the statute readily divides it into two separate clauses, one of
which suggests a negligence standard and the other requiring scienter.328 The
legislative history of the Williams Act also suggests that Congress intended
Section 14(e) to require less than a showing of scienter.329 Although courts have
used Rule 10b-5 when interpreting Section 14(e), it is inappropriate to use an
SEC-promulgated rule, restricted by its authorizing statute, to interpret a statute
promulgated by Congress itself and subject to no such restrictions.330 A better
320

Id. § 78n(e).
Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697.
322
Id.
323
See id.
324
See supra Part II.B.
325
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 406 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. dismissed 586 U.S. ___ (Apr.
23, 2019) (No. 18-459).
326
Id. (quoting Jonah R. v. Carmona, 446 F.3d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 2006)).
327
Id.
328
See supra Part II.A.
329
See supra Part II.B.
330
See supra Part II.C.
321
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comparison would be to Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, which does not
require proof of scienter and has language and purpose similar to that of Section
14(e).331
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED NEGLIGENCE STANDARD
The scienter approach has facilitated a corporate culture in which company
executives can put their own interests ahead of shareholders’ interests without
facing allegations that they violated securities laws. Implementing a negligence
standard would place a much-needed spotlight on how these executives handle
third-party takeovers. A negligence standard would also have various
implications on this country’s judicial system. Since shareholders could more
easily prove a violation of Section 14(e), there would be an increase in claims
asserted against a company’s top executives. Because a negligence standard
would place a company’s top executives at a higher risk of these claims being
asserted against them, a negligence approach could create positive change
toward executives focusing more on shareholders’ interests than on their own
interests when evaluating tender offers.
One major implication of a negligence standard is that shareholders would
have an easier time asserting a violation of Section 14(e). A shareholder would
only have to prove that an executive made an untrue statement of material fact
or misled them by omitting a material fact. Unlike a scienter requirement, a
negligence standard does not require the shareholder to go into the mind of the
executive. Mere negligence can result without any intentional wrongdoing at all,
but rather by the failure to act with the duty of care necessarily required by the
company’s executive. While this looser standard might concern some, it does
not follow that the standard would place unfair and unwarranted liability on
innocent executives. These executives should be well aware that their primary
responsibility lies with the shareholders. They are hired to represent the
shareholders’ best interests and to make business decisions that will positively
impact those interests.
Moreover, a negligence standard does not mean that shareholders would be
able to successfully allege a violation of Section 14(e) on every occasion. One
major safeguard protecting company executives from potential liability is the
requirement that an alleged untrue statement or omitted fact be material.332 Not
every fact is of consequence. To be material, the shareholders must prove that
they would have arrived at a different conclusion had the executives not made
331
332

See supra Part II.D.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012) (emphasis added).
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the untrue statement, or had the executives not omitted the fact. The facts of
Varjabedian serve as a useful example. In that case, the shareholders alleged
that they were misled by Emulex and its executives when they failed to disclose
Goldman Sachs’s finding that Emulex’s premium was below average compared
to similar mergers.333 Despite this fact, Goldman Sachs still opined that the
merger was fair to the shareholders, and that opinion was communicated in
Emulex’s recommendation letter to its shareholders without the full report by
Goldman Sachs.334 Although the Ninth Circuit did not answer whether the
omission of the below-average premium was material, the court noted that it
would be difficult for the shareholders to prove that the omission was indeed
material.335 The shareholders would have to prove that had they known
Emulex’s premiums fell below average, they would have rejected the tender
offer.
In addition to the potential impact that a negligence standard would have on
the judicial system, it could also affect the way company executives approach
their jobs. Executives owe a duty of care to the shareholders, which requires
them to act in accordance with the shareholders’ best interests when making
business decisions. However, one can imagine a situation in which a company’s
shareholders receive a tender offer, and the company’s executives are torn
between their duty to the shareholders and their own concerns. If the tender offer
is technically fair and beneficial to the shareholders, then the executives should
recommend that the shareholders accept it. However, the executives may begin
to wonder if a change in control will mean a subsequent change in management.
The executives may grow concerned about the safety of their positions and the
future of the company. A negligence standard under Section 14(e) contemplates
a broader range of conduct, which would likely ensure that executives are more
cautious when communicating material information to the shareholders. A
negligence standard would more strongly encourage executives to act in
accordance with the shareholders’ interests instead of their own.
CONCLUSION
Securities fraud laws provide shareholders with the comfort they need to
make smart investment decisions that align with their best interests. Specifically,
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act guarantees that shareholders are accurately
informed of all the information material to them when evaluating tender offers.
333
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 403 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. dismissed 586 U.S. ___ (Apr.
23, 2019) (No. 18-459).
334
Id. at 402–03.
335
Id. at 408.
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Unfortunately, circuit courts have been providing less protection to shareholders
than might be mandated by Section 14(e), imposing a scienter requirement
primarily based on the similar language between Section 14(e) and Rule 10b-5.
This Comment criticized that approach and argued that the case law under Rule
10b-5 should carry no precedential weight in Section 14(e) claims.
Although the correct burden of proof under Section 14(e) remains
unresolved by the Supreme Court, this Comment argued that the appropriate
approach to Section 14(e) claims is a negligence standard. Both a plain reading
of the statute and the legislative history of the Williams Act support a negligence
standard. In the absence of clear congressional intent to the contrary, it follows
that Section 14(e) allows for shareholders to allege mere negligence rather than
requiring proof of scienter. The potential impact that a negligence standard
would have on the judicial system and on company executives provides further
support for the conclusion drawn. Ultimately, a negligence standard could
provide additional assurance to shareholders that company executives are indeed
acting in accordance with the shareholders’ best interests.
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